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The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) returns to its homeport of Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following sea trials, Sept. 19, 2012
The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) returns to its homeport of Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following sea trials, Sept. 19, 2012

Facts We Can Agree Upon About Design of Ohio Replacement SSBN

By Rear Adm. Richard Breckenridge
Director, Undersea Warfare, OPNAV N97

 

Over the last five years, the Navy – working with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense – has formally examined various options to replace the Ohio ballistic missile submarines as they retire beginning in 2027. This analysis included a variety of replacement platform options, including designs based on the highly successful Virginia-class attack submarine program and the current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. In the end, the Navy elected to pursue a new design that leverages the lessons from the Ohio, the Virginia advances in shipbuilding and improvements in cost-efficiency.

The ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) returns to homeport at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following a strategic deterrent patrol, June 6. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes/Released)
The ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) returns to homeport at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following a strategic deterrent patrol, June 6. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes/Released)

Recently, a variety of writers have speculated that the required survivable deterrence could be achieved more cost effectively with the Virginia-based option or by restarting the Ohio-class SSBN production line. Both of these ideas make sense at face value – which is why they were included among the alternatives assessed – but the devil is in the details. When we examined the particulars, each of these options came up short in both military effectiveness and cost efficiency.

Virginia-based SSBN design with a Trident II D5 missile. An SSBN design based on a Virginia-class attack submarine with a large-diameter missile compartment was rejected due to a wide range of shortfalls. It would:

  • Not meet survivability (stealth) requirements due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a drive train able to quietly propel a much larger ship
  • Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is packed more tightly within the hull, it requires more time to replace, repair and retest)
  • Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed)
  • Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement
  • Reduce the deterrent value needed to protect the country (fewer missiles, warheads at-sea)
  • Be more expensive than other alternatives due to extensive redesign of Virginia systems to work with the large missile compartment (for example, a taller sail, larger control surfaces and more robust support systems)

We would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced at-sea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy).

The Virginia-class attack submarine Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Minnesota (SSN 783) pulls pierside at Naval Station Norfolk from a scheduled underway, June 24. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex R. Forster/Released)
The Virginia-class attack submarine Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Minnesota (SSN 783) pulls pierside at Naval Station Norfolk from a scheduled underway, June 24. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex R. Forster/Released)

Virginia-based SSBN design with a smaller missile. Some have encouraged the development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN. This would carry forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN we just discussed, and add to it a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current missile to decouple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program from the new replacement submarine program. Additionally, a smaller missile means a shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately weaken our deterrence effectiveness. With significant cost, technical and schedule risks, there is little about this option that is attractive.

Ohio-based SSBN design. Some have argued that we should re-open the Ohio production line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs. This simply cannot be done because there is no Ohio production line. It has long since been re-tooled and modernized to build state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated construction techniques. Is it desirable to redesign the Ohio so that a ship with its legacy performance could be built using the new production facilities? No, since an Ohio-based SSBN would:

  • Not provide the required quieting due to Ohio design constraints and use of a propeller instead of a propulsor (which is the standard for virtually all new submarines)
  • Require 14 instead of 12 SSBNs by reverting to Ohio class operational availability standards (incidentally creating other issues with the New START treaty limits)
  • Suffer from reduced reliability and costs associated with the obsolescence of legacy Ohio system components

Once again, the end result would necessitate procuring more submarines (14) to provide the required at-sea presence and each of them would be less stealthy and less survivable against foreseeable 21st century threats. 

The Right Answer:  A new design SSBN that improves on Ohio:  What has emerged from the Navy’s exhaustive analysis is an Ohio replacement submarine that starts with the foundation of the proven performance of the Ohio SSBN, its Trident II D5 strategic weapons system and its operating cycle. To this it adds:

  • Enhanced stealth as necessary to pace emerging threats expected over its service life 
  • Systems commonality with Virginia (pumps, valves, sonars, etc.) wherever possible, enabling cost savings in design, procurement, maintenance and logistics 
  • Modular construction and use of COTS equipment consistent with those used in today’s submarines to reduce the cost of fabrication, maintenance and modernization. Total ownership cost reduction (for example, investing in a life-of-the-ship reactor core enables providing the same at-sea presence with fewer platforms). 

Although the Ohio replacement is a “new design,” it is in effect an SSBN that takes the best lessons from 50 years of undersea deterrence, from the Ohio, from the Virginia, from advances in shipbuilding efficiency and maintenance, and from the stern realities of needing to provide survivable nuclear deterrence. The result is a low-risk, cost-effective platform capable of smoothly transitioning from the Ohio and delivering effective 21st century undersea strategic deterrence.

What do you think? Let us know by commenting below.

 

 

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8 comments

  1. Did you consider a Seawolf-based SSBN design with a D5 missile? This would have significantly mitigated the hull streamlining issue and completely eliminated the drive train power issue; plus, we’ve already proven we can insert a module into the middle of a Seawolf hull.

  2. At the rate the Federal government’s fiscal house is collapsing, by 2027 let’s see whether the Navy has a shipbuilding budget to replace the Ohio class. I, for one, am not optimistic.

  3. Good post, but I’m curious why only 12 new boomers will be built, and why they will carry fewer missiles than the Ohios. Is that because of budgets or NEW START?

  4. OldUSSMiamiSailor

    concur. of course, i work for General Dynamics :P

  5. Very wel read article and I agree with much of the analysis, but I think there are a few more points to consider.

    Much of Virginia leverages inexpensive, readily available COTS items. While the benefits of this are obvious, there are a lot of downsides to this including CM, availability of replacement parts, and reliability. While its going to reduce your upfront capital costs, it can really bite you in the butt down the road.

    If you are privileged to the Ohio design, you know that they use COTS sparingly for just these issues. Contractors made mostly all of their own hardware so that the entire design is configuration controlled. All boats have the same strategic weapons systems configuration and by the way, the Navy owns all the rights to the designs! This is not the case for Virginia and will not be the case for ORP.

    I wholeheartedly agree that a modified Virginia platform is not the correct solution, especially one that requires a missile/guidance redesign when SP is already executing a life extension program. I am a little skeptical of the rationale given not start rebuilding upgraded Ohios. Clearly the modular design of the new boats will bring cost savings, but so will not having to build new hulls. Do to operational requirements, a minimum number of hulls will be required, but if you want a solution to that, I say pull the SSGN’s to get started, gut them down to the steel, and modify them with upgraded systems and a new engine compartment.

    Yes, I understand the appeal of a fresh new boat that is designed from the ground up with CAD, modular design, and quieter systems, and fresh high-tech paint. The new boats are downsizing the number of tubes regardless, so I don’t see how a Ohio based design whether it be new or re-used would increase the boat number requirement from 12 to 14, especially when you have 24 tubes. If the argument to due this is that you need to reduce the number of delivery vehicles due to New START, then cut a section out of the hull and pull a few sets of tubes. Decreasing the mid-body isn’t going to mess up your stealth performance, so that isn’t a valid argument either!

    This was a bit of a rant, but to be fair, I liked the article. It provided a lot of great insight into the Navy’s decision to go with a new boat, but I hope they considered this option seriously, especially considering the fiscal pressure the Navy is under.

  6. United States Navy

    Thank you for your insight into possible alternatives for future strategic deterrence. Your idea to base the SSBN replacement on the Seawolf hull with a large diameter missile compartment has merit but was rejected due to a wide range of shortfalls. It would:

    – Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is packed more tightly within the hull; it requires more time to replace, repair and retest.)

    – Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed)

    – Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement

    Be more expensive than other alternatives due to:

    – Having to restart Seawolf equipment production lines

    – Failing to take advantage of Virginia cost cutting experience (Virginia delivered Seawolf stealth at an affordable cost)

    -Having to build more ships to make up for the lost operational availability

    -Not being able to take advantage of the economies of scale by building Virginia and Ohio replacement with common components

    Ultimately, we would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced at-sea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy).

  7. Has any thought been given to using the same basic design for replacement of the four SSGNs?

  8. Regardless of the expenditure, you can’t design or pay for the D-5’s record of reliability.

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